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Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.:
Underestimating The Power Of
A Power Of Appointment
Samuel A. Donaldson*
At his death in 1932, young Zachary Smith Reynolds (“Smith,” to
family and friends)1 was the beneficiary of three trusts established by his
parents.2 Each trust gave Smith a testamentary power to appoint the
corpus to anyone he chose. Smith never exercised these powers, so the
property presumably passed to his descendants3 as takers in default.4
* Professor, Georgia State University College of Law.
1 Smith died at the age of 20. As Wikipedia recounts it:
Reynolds died under mysterious circumstances from an automatic .32 caliber
Mauser pistol shot through his head . . . after a 21st birthday party for his
friend. . . . His wife [entertainer] Libby Holman Reynolds was pregnant with
their child.
Reynolds’ boyhood friend and personal assistant [Albert Walker] had stayed
over after the party, and he reported that he heard a gunshot from downstairs
and immediately afterwards Holman ran to the balcony and shouted, “Smith’s
killed himself!” Walker said he found Reynolds bleeding and unconscious upstairs, with a bullet wound in his right temple. . . .
The death was originally ruled a suicide, but a coroner’s inquiry subsequently
ruled the death a murder. Both Walker and Holman were considered suspects
in his death and were both indicted for first-degree murder of Reynolds—
Holman for the murder itself and Walker as an accomplice. The murder attracted national attention. Reporters printed allegations that Holman had conducted an affair with Walker. Reynolds’ uncle William Neal Reynolds told the
district attorney that the family supported dropping the charges; the prosecutor
eventually did so for lack of evidence, and no trial was ever held.
Zachary Smith Reynolds, WIKIPEDIA (July 7, 2016, 10:45 AM), https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/ Zachary_Smith_Reynolds.
2 Smith’s father was the famous R.J. Reynolds, founder of the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 316 U.S. 56, 57 (1942).
3 Id. Smith had a daughter from his first marriage, and his surviving spouse, Libby
Holman, gave birth to a son six months after Smith’s death.
4 The Restatement and the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act provide that if
there is no taker in default provided for in the instrument conferring the power of appointment, the property passes to the powerholder’s estate unless the powerholder releases or expressly refrains from exercising the power, in which case the property reverts
back to the donor or the donor’s estate. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 19.22 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); UNIF. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
ACT § 310 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). See also JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 827-28 (6th ed. 2000).
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Though he never exercised the powers, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
concluded that merely having them caused the value of the assets from
all three trusts to be included in Smith’s gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes—a conclusion affirmed both by the Board of Tax Appeals5
and the Fourth Circuit.6 The issue before the United States Supreme
Court in Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore,7 then, was
whether a decedent’s gross estate includes the value of property over
which the decedent held an unexercised testamentary general power of
appointment.
Today, of course, the answer is clearly yes. Section 2041(a)(2) expressly requires gross estate inclusion of “property with respect to which
the decedent has at the time of his death a general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942 . . . .”8 The statute defines a “general power of appointment” as one “exercisable in favor the decedent,
his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate,” with exceptions
for powers limited by an ascertainable standard and certain powers exercisable only in conjunction with another.9 Having the power to appoint to anyone, including his estate, Smith held general powers of
appointment over each trust. So had he died today, the value of the
assets of the trusts would be included in his gross estate.
But section 2041 did not exist in 1932. The only statutory basis for
including the assets in his gross estate was section 302(a) of the Revenue
Act of 1926, the ancestor to today’s section 2033. It required inclusion
of “all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated . . . [t]o the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time
of his death.” Under that language, anything answering the definition of
a property interest was properly includible in a decedent’s gross estate.
That’s where things got tricky. Historically, the common law does
not consider a power of appointment to rise to the level of a property
interest.10 Rather, the law sees it as a tool enabling a powerholder to
“do an act” for the person granting the power.11 So piddling is the
power of appointment that the Court in 1921 ruled that property passing
pursuant the exercise of a general power of appointment was not includible in the powerholder’s gross estate.12 Congress fixed that in subse5

Estate of Reynolds v. Comm’r, 42 B.T.A. 145, 171 (1940).
Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 121 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1941).
7 Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 316 U.S. 56, 63 (1942).
8 I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2).
9 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1).
10 See, e.g., Lawrence Berger, The General Power of Appointment as an Interest in
Property, 40 NEB. L. REV., 104, 107 (1960); Lewis M. Simes, Fifty Years of Future Interests, 50 HARV. L. REV. 749, 772 (1937).
11 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 823.
12 See United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257, 257 (1921).
6
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quent legislation, expressly including in a powerholder’s gross estate the
value of property passing at death through the exercise of a general
power of appointment.13
But the new statute said nothing about unexercised powers, and
that, according to Justice Black (writing for a unanimous Court on this
point), made all the difference: “From this deliberate singling out of exercised powers alone,” he wrote, “a Congressional intent to treat unexercised powers otherwise can be deduced.”14 Thus, said the Court, the
assets of the three trusts, though subject to an unexercised general
power of appointment, could not be included in Smith’s gross estate.
The holding is defensible, albeit flawed. The Court correctly observed that the new legislation related only to exercised general powers,
so one could conclude that a different rule might apply to unexercised
powers. Alas, the Court stopped there, never considering whether a different rule should apply. When one realizes the purpose of the federal
estate tax, though, it becomes apparent that gross estate inclusion
should also be required for property subject to an unexercised general
power of appointment.
It starts with a simple axiom: an estate tax is an excise on the transfer of wealth at death.15 As such, the tax looks for wealth transferred at
death by direction the decedent. Formal ownership of wealth at death
does not matter as much as control over what happens to the wealth at
death. Assets owned outright by a decedent are properly subject to federal estate tax because the assets transfer at the decedent’s death and at
the direction of the decedent. Even where the decedent dies intestate,
there is gross estate inclusion; the law correctly presumes that by not
properly executing a valid will or transferring the assets in trust inter
vivos, the decedent effectively elects to use the default scheme in the
applicable intestate succession statute.
Property subject to a decedent’s unexercised general power of appointment also answers this description. By not exercising the power,
the decedent effectively opts to let the property pass to the taker in
default.16 It is still a testamentary wealth transfer directed by the dece13

Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 402(e), 40 Stat. 1097, 1097 (1918).
Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 316 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1941).
15 JOHN R. PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE
PLANNING 2033 (2016).
16 One might question equating non-exercise of a general power of appointment
with affirmatively selecting the taker in default as the appointee. Reading a motive into
the non-exercise of a power is a dicey game, but given that § 2518 requires a qualified
disclaimer to renounce a power of appointment, one cannot assume a non-exercise as a
relinquishment of the power. Plus, as discussed in the main text, there is the long-standing presumption that an intestate decedent elects to use the intestacy statute. Assuming
14
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dent. For that reason, property subject to an unexercised general power
of appointment is properly a part of a decedent’s gross estate.17
The Safe Deposit & Trust Court pledged allegiance to the interpretive canon that a taxing statute should be narrowly construed; since the
applicable statutory scheme dealt only with exercised powers, there was
no basis for including property subject to an unexercised power. It
would have been better, however, for the Court to consider how its result squares with the statute’s overarching premise. The Court also
should have considered the statutory interpretation issues that would
emerge in the wake of its decision. As a result of the Court’s decision,
for instance, it mattered whether a decedent held a general power of
appointment (as opposed to a “limited” or “special” power) and
whether that power was exercised by the decedent. Alas, the statute
neither defined a “general” power nor the events that would constitute
an “exercise” of that power. Absent guidance on these issues, the dichotomies created by the Court would be vexing.18
Congressional response was swift. The Revenue Act of 194219 required gross estate inclusion for all property subject to a general power
of appointment held at death, regardless of whether the power was exercised at or before death. It also captured certain releases of general
powers of appointment.20 The legislation effectively overruled Safe Deposit & Trust.
Safe Deposit & Trust was wrongly decided, but in its error the
Court shed light on the need for clear rules related to the most important “non-interest” in all of property law. Powers of appointment continue to play a prominent role in contemporary estate planning.
Modernly, for example, planners use general powers of appointment to
achieve favorable federal income tax results upon the death of a
powerholder. To illustrate, consider the common case where a testamentary trust confers a general power of appointment to the decedent’s
surviving spouse. The power triggers inclusion of the value of the trust
non-exercise of a general power of appointment as a decision to appoint to the taker in
default is thus the only assumption consistent with the transfer tax’s statutory scheme.
17 Theoretically gross estate inclusion would not be proper if the decedent was either unaware of the power’s existence or unable to exercise the power at the moment of
death. In fact, on behalf of Smith’s estate in Safe Deposit & Trust, the trustee argued this
very point, observing that Smith was not yet old enough at the date of his death to effectively exercise the powers he held. In holding that the nature of Smith’s powers was
outside the scope of the statute, the Court never squarely addressed this argument.
Helvering, 316 U.S. at 58.
18 See generally RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION
¶ 4.13[10] (9th ed. 2013).
19 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 403(a), 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
20 The Act took effect on October 21, 1942, which explains the distinction between
powers created before and after that date in today’s § 2041.
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assets in the spouse’s gross estate. Yet with the $5 million exclusion
currently in effect,21 gross estate inclusion in many cases will not lead to
liability for federal estate tax. In this way, gross estate inclusion serves a
different (and favorable) purpose. Because the trust assets will be included in the spouse’s gross estate, they will be treated as property acquired from the spouse as a decedent, enabling the taker in default to
claim a stepped-up basis equal to the value of the assets as of the
spouse’s death.22 The general power of appointment, then, serves as a
vehicle to ensure a second step-up in basis for income tax purposes.

21 I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(A) provides for a “basic exclusion amount” of $5 million, but
§ 2010(c)(3)(B) requires inflation adjustments to that figure. See Rev. Proc. 2015-53,
2015-44 I.R.B. 615 (showing that in 2016, for example, the inflation-adjusted basis exclusion amount was $5.45 million).
22 I.R.C. § 1014(b)(9).

